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War Without Violence: Leveraging 
the Arab Spring to Win the War on 
Terrorism
Pat Proctor
Kansas State University
Introduction
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the United States faces a new kind 
of threat that defies the overwhelming military might that has made the 
United States the world's sole remaining superpower. This threat began 
as an idea, salafism, which typifies the yearning of a people to return to a 
mythical "golden age" of Islam. This idea in turn inspired a holy war, a 
jihad, against the West.1 Salafist jihadism was the foundation of a global 
Abstract
After a decade of war, the United States has failed to eradicate the threat 
of salafist jihadism. No matter how hard it tries, the United States cannot 
kill its way to victory in the war on terrorism. Sweeping changes across 
the Middle East—dubbed the "Arab Spring" by the media—have pre-
sented the West with a unique opportunity to pursue an alternative 
approach. Rather than engaging in war (politics through violence), the 
United States should engage in mass politics (war without violence) to 
compel the Arab world to reject the salafist jihadism idea. This article pro-
poses a strategy calibrated to defeat international terrorism without 
unnecessarily antagonizing non-jihadist salafists and political salafists 
who enjoy broad-based support in the Arab world. The article goes on to 
identify key political figures already espousing elements of this counter-
narrative, and it describes the methods the United States should use to 
empower these and other anti–salafist jihadism activists.
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terrorist network that launched a wave of terrorist violence culminating in 
the attacks in New York and Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001. 
When the United States responded with overwhelming military force 
against the heart of this network in Afghanistan, salafist jihadism metas-
tasized into an even more difficult problem, a global movement that con-
tinued a wave of terrorist violence across Europe and the Muslim world.2
Only days after the September 11 attacks, in a speech before a joint session 
of Congress, President George W. Bush declared a "global war on terror,"3 
yet, after a decade of war, the United States has failed to eradicate the 
threat of salafist jihadism. Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz 
wrote, "War is … an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,"4 yet, 
no matter how hard it tries, the United States cannot kill its way to victory 
in this war. There is simply no government to force to capitulate. More-
over, the population that must be compelled to abandon salafist jihadism 
is so vast and spread over such a large area that the level of violence 
required is beyond both the United States' capacity and its will. In short, 
this threat defies war as a solution.
The United States needs an alternative way to persuade the Muslim world 
to reject the salafist jihadism idea. Fortunately, communist revolutionary 
Chairman Mao Zedong has provided a useful corollary to Clausewitz: 
"Politics is war without [violence]."5 The United States needs to engage in 
politics, mass politics, with the people of the Arab world to compel them 
to reject salafist jihadism as a path to overcome perceived Western domi-
nation and to help them achieve individual freedom.
Sweeping changes across the Middle East that had nothing to do with the 
war on terrorism have presented the West with a unique opportunity to 
pursue this alternative. For example, Arab youth, fed up with the lack of 
opportunity and political liberties in their country, poured into the streets 
of Tunisia in a revolution that toppled President Zine el Abidine bin Ali's 
twenty-three-year-old regime. Weeks later, in February 2011, throngs of 
Egyptian protestors toppled the thirty-year-old regime of President Hosni 
Mubarak.6 This tectonic shift—the overthrow of the political order of the 
most populous country in the Arab world—generated a tsunami that 
washed over the Middle East. Protestors poured into the streets of Alge-
ria, Libya, Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Even countries as far 
away as China and Venezuela felt the aftershocks. This wave of change, 
dubbed the "Arab Spring" by the media, has presented an appealing 
opportunity to reshape the Muslim world.
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The Salafist Jihadism Idea
In the final days of Islamic independence, before the great powers of 
Europe ultimately carved up and colonized the Arab world, a word began 
to emerge to describe the humiliation Islam was suffering at the hands of 
the West. Scholars debate its first use; there is disagreement as to whether 
it arrived with the British domination of Sudan beginning in the late nine-
teenth century or in the aftermath of World War I. However, from the 
Maghreb (North Africa) to Mesopotamia, Arabs began using the word 
ista'mar to describe their predicament. Alternately translated as "to colo-
nize" or "to exploit," the word became synonymous with the—at times—
brutal domination of the Arab world by the West.7
The struggle to defeat the ista'mar has fueled a succession of ideologies 
among the Arabs; as such, salafism is only one in a host of ideologies that 
have vied for dominance as a solution to the ista'mar. From the Arabic 
word salafi, meaning "ancestors" or "earlier generations," salafism hark-
ens back to a mythical "golden age" of Islam in its purest form, as prac-
ticed by the Prophet and his Companions, the Sahaba.8
Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, founder of Wahhabism, in the early 
eighteenth century, was the father of modern salafism. He earned the 
patronage of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Saud in 1740 when Saud promised 
to support the spread of Wahhabism in exchange for political support. 
This alliance persisted through the generations of conflict that finally saw 
the Saud family take over the entirety of the Nejd and Hejaz (the Arabian 
Peninsula).9 More importantly, however, the Saudis had managed to 
maintain true independence from the West, one of the only states in the 
Arab world not under the yoke of the ista'mar.
These first salafists had sought purer personal and community practice of 
Islam as a religion. Yet their goal, even before the concept of the ista'mar 
had crystallized in the Arab mind, was a return to the former glory of the 
Islamic Empire. The salafists held that the Islamic world could only 
return to this age by a return to strict adherence to the faith as it was prac-
ticed by the first generation of Muslims, especially the Sahaba.10
After the First World War, at the same time that Arab nationalism was 
taking shape in Egypt, salafism reemerged and began to evolve. This new 
strain of salafism that emerged from the intellectual class in Egypt in the 
1920s was political salafism—the idea that, to defeat the ista'mar, the 
state must reject modernism and reorder Arab governments and societies 
as prescribed by the Quran.11
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In 1928, political salafism spawned a political party, the Society of Muslim 
Brothers (more commonly known as the Muslim Brotherhood). Its ideol-
ogy is detailed in Sayyid Qutb's seminal work, Ma'alim fil-Tariq (Sign-
posts along the Road). In it, he laid out both the faults of Western 
modernism and the principles (but not the form) of an ideal political 
salafist society. In Signposts, Qutb called for the Islamic world to reject 
modernism and its Western-style political structures as Jahiliyyah, a 
pejorative referring to the Arabs' pre-Quranic, pagan practices. Qutb con-
demned both communist and democratic government as Jahiliyyah.12 
Instead, Qutb insisted, Islam should return to a society as dictated by the 
Quran, under the power of the shari'a, Islamic law.13
In the 1980s, in the mujahideen training camps of the Soviet-Afghan war, 
political salafist ideology met Pakistani jihadism, forged over more than a 
century of conflict with both British colonial rule and Indian Hindu 
nationalism. When these ideologies met, they metastasized into some-
thing new.14 Political salafist Usama bin Laden, educated in a Saudi uni-
versity by Muslim Brothers and immersed in Pakistani jihadism during 
the Soviet-Afghan war, was a vessel for this blend of ideologies.
As the jihad in Afghanistan ended, ibn Laden saw Western troops in his 
homeland of Saudi Arabia preparing to deal humiliation to Arab Iraq. 
Even more outrageous, the old salafists—the Wahhabi clerics—supported 
the Saudi king's decision.15 This completed his rejection of the Whhabists' 
brand of salafism (focused on individual living and practice of Islam). 
After ibn Laden was exiled by the Saudis, he drifted into the orbit of fel-
low–former mujahideen Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was leading a political 
salafist insurgency in his home country of Egypt, the Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad. Together, they concluded that the insurgencies of political salafism 
were not sufficient to overcome the ista'mar. They could never overturn 
the authority of apostate regimes in the Middle East until they first 
removed the far enemy, the Western regimes that fueled the ista'mar. The 
jihad, they decided, should be exported to the West and especially to the 
United States, the sole remaining superpower.
This marked a new evolutionary step in salafist ideology: salafist jihad-
ism. The defeat of the ista'mar and return to the greatness of Islam's 
golden age could only come about by: strict adherence to Islam as prac-
ticed by the Sahaba in the days of the Prophet; rejection of the Jahiliyyah 
of Western modernism and its political structures; and a jihad prosecuted 
by every Muslim.16 But salafist jihadism went one critical step further: the 
jihad should be taken out of the Islamic world, directly to the West, in the 
form of international terrorism. This is the raison d'être of al-Qaida, the 
standard-bearer of the salafist jihadism ideology.
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The Promise of the Arab Spring
As of 2008, nearly 65 percent of the population of the Arab world was 
under the age of thirty. This "youth bulge," constituting both the labor 
and the intellectual class, embodies the demographic and economic future 
of the Arab world.17 Nonetheless, this majority is denied political power 
by not one but two powerful forces. On the one hand, many Arab youth 
believe that the manifestation of the ista'mar in their countries via West-
ern-backed authoritarian regimes unjustly represses them. On the other 
hand, the salafist jihadist movement accompanied by the threat of totali-
tarian rule continuously smothers the hope of mass political participa-
tion. This instability has brought the Arab world to a tipping point. 
Without a singular, unifying ideology, the "Arab street" on its own is over-
coming the ista'mar, one of the chief obstacles that has prevented them 
from achieving individual political power. The challenge for the West now 
is to quickly turn this fervor into a movement that will also defeat the 
other obstacle to their individual political power, salafist jihadism.
Salafist jihadism is an ideology, an idea that has mobilized a global move-
ment. The United States has tried to use warfare to defeat this idea and 
has failed. An idea can only be defeated by another idea. The United 
States must first identify the elements of this counter-idea, an "anti" 
salafist jihadism idea that is intended to counter all of salafist jihadism 
(that is to say salafist-inspired jihadism). Such an idea must be generated 
within and propagated by the Arab world in order to be effective. After the 
United States has identified where this idea might gain a foothold, it must 
move quickly, while new political orders are still forming in the Middle 
East, to forge new, national anti salafist jihadism movements in each Arab 
country in the region.
As will be shown in a moment, the anti salafist jihadism idea has existed 
in the Arab world for years, as have elements of these national anti salafist 
jihadism movements. But, until recently, the authoritarian Western-
backed regimes of the prerevolution Arab world limited political power in 
the government to the oligarchy and brutally repressed activism among 
the people. This is where the Arab Spring phenomenon offers an opportu-
nity that has never existed before, the opportunity to build national anti 
salafist jihadist movements—with influence—within the government, the 
media, and the people of their respective countries. With these regimes 
now overthrown, the future of each government is an open question. The 
people of these countries are already mobilized and, for the first time, free 
to express their opinions and responsive to activism. The U.S. govern-
ment, with the help of the international community and anti salafist jiha-
dist activists, must foster new national movements in these countries.
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Building the government wing of a national anti salafist jihadist move-
ment in a country like Egypt, Tunisia, or Libya, where the governments 
has already been unseated, or in a country like Syria, where the armed 
rebellion against the regime is ongoing, involves empowering those will-
ing to embrace anti–salafist jihadism. First, the U.S. must use diplomatic 
and intelligence means to identify those individuals. Once they are identi-
fied, a combination of money and preferred access to U.S. representatives 
and business opportunities can be used to empower them through a com-
bination of public diplomacy and covert means, all of which will vary in 
each country according to its unique conditions. In countries like Syria, 
where an armed struggle continues, covert or overt military assistance, in 
the form of military hardware, training, or even air or drone strikes can be 
used to weight the outcome in favor of leaders who embrace the anti 
salafist jihadist idea. This method will also work to a lesser degree in 
countries like Bahrain, where governments are currently engaged in 
armed suppression of anti-government demonstrations in their countries.
The United States can also foster the development of activism by national 
anti salafist jihadism movements. Using the public diplomacy tools cur-
rently present in U.S. embassies across the Arab world, the U.S. State 
Department can empower activists with Internet access to spread the anti 
salafist jihadism idea within their own countries.18 These same tools can 
be used to train national anti salafist jihadist activists in the use of new 
media like blogs and social media such as Facebook and Twitter to call 
other young Arabs to activism. Through partnership with U.S.-based 
media, the U.S. government can also publicize national anti salafist jihad-
ist activists and bring international attention to their activities. Finally, as 
has been the practice since the beginning of the War on Terrorism, the 
U.S. government should, through diplomacy and economic incentives, 
continue to encourage allied Muslim countries inside and outside the 
Arab world to oppose salafist jihadism. However, with the advent of new 
anti salafist jihadist movements, these regimes should be encouraged to 
support this activism. Because it will be focused on encouraging opposi-
tion to salafist jihadism rather than the spread of democratic freedom, 
Arab governments (equally threatened by salafist jihadism) may be eager 
to support activism of this kind. They could do so by encouraging the pan-
Arab networks in their countries to favorably cover these movements, giv-
ing activists access to Internet and other communication means, and pro-
viding money to support their activities.
While the countries that have been transformed by the Arab Spring are 
the most susceptible to the development of national anti salafist jihadist 
movements, that does not mean that national movements in other coun-
tries are not possible. For example, nearly nine years in Iraq has given the 
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United States a very close relationship with figures in both the media and 
the government. Iraqi media already provides a strong anti salafist jihad-
ist media wing. Sunni Arab reconciliationists currently serving in the 
Iraqi government, who have already stood up to al-Qaida in Iraq to partic-
ipate in the Iraqi political process, could form the core of an Iraqi anti 
salafist jihadist political wing. Similarly, the al Sawah (Awakening move-
ment) sheikhs, with both the military power of their Sons of Iraq (Sunni 
militias first sponsored by the United States during the Iraq "surge") and 
the social legitimacy of their status as tribal sheikhs, have risked their 
lives to demonstrate that they reject salafist jihadism. They could serve as 
members of either the political or activist wing of an anti salafist jihadist 
movement.
Despite the Arab Spring, some countries in the Arab world have remained 
authoritarian. Monarchies like Saudi Arabia and Jordan and emirates like 
the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, to varying degrees, already support 
anti salafist jihadism. They also, to varying degrees, have tightly con-
trolled media that could be directed to reinforce the anti salafist jihadism 
idea. And, of course, these regimes could force their people out into the 
streets in support of any agenda, including anti salafist jihadism. How-
ever, in some respects, fostering movements in these countries can be 
counterproductive. People in these countries are savvy—a necessity of 
survival under brutal regimes. They will no doubt see anti salafist jihad-
ism as an artificially generated movement. People resentful of their 
regime and prone to blame the West for their regime's longevity are likely 
to see anti salafist jihadism as just another affront of the ista'mar. Press-
ing anti salafist jihadism in these countries might actually have the unin-
tended effect of strengthening the case for salafist jihadism.
The Anti Salafist Jihadism Idea
So far, this article has discussed how national anti salafist jihadist move-
ments could be formed. But movements form around an idea. The heart 
of a mass-political approach to defeating salafist jihadism must be an 
idea. First and foremost, this idea must come from the Arab world, the 
population targeted by the salafist jihadism idea. In fact, as will be shown 
in a moment, the seeds of an idea already exist and are being expressed by 
prominent figures throughout the Arab world. These advocates just need 
functioning anti salafist jihadist media wings to propagate their ideas and 
strong political and activist wings to exploit their success.
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What does an anti salafist jihadism idea look like? Military theorist David 
Galula, in his book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 
generalizes his observations from the French counterinsurgency in Alge-
ria to produce a theory of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. For 
Galula, a key element of insurgency is the cause, a political idea that 
drives the movement. Galula felt that a cause (or idea) and its representa-
tive insurgency (or movement) must proceed from a political problem. 
Galula asks, "What is a political problem?" He then responds:
"It is 'an unsolved contradiction,' according to Mao Tse-tung. If 
one accepts this definition, then a political cause is the champion-
ing of one side of the contradiction. In other words, where there is 
no problem, there is no cause, but there are always problems in 
any country."19
Galula goes on to list four different "natures" of a problem:
1. The problem may be essentially political, related to the national or 
international situation of the country....
2. The problem may be social, as when one class is exploited by another or 
denied any possibility of improving its lot....
3. The problem may be economic, such as the low price of agricultural 
products in relation to industrial goods, or the low price of raw mate-
rial in relation to finished products, or the import of foreign goods 
rather than the development a national industry....
4. The problem may even be artificial as long as it has a chance to be 
accepted as a fact.20
Finally, Galula tells the reader:
"It is not absolutely necessary that the problem be acute, although 
the insurgent's work is facilitated if such is the case. If the prob-
lem is merely latent, the first task of the insurgent is to make it 
acute by 'raising the political consciousness of the masses.'"21
Thus a problem, the progenitor of a cause, is a political, social, economic, 
or artificial contradiction in a society that is either acute or made acute by 
a movement.
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The problem for the anti salafist jihadism idea must be salafist jihadism 
itself—a political, social, and economic problem. Salafist jihadism is an 
international political problem because it empowers the movement, al-
Qaida, to act as a destructive independent, non-state actor on the interna-
tional stage, provoking a violent response from the West. Salafist jihadism 
is a social problem because it fosters a violent, nihilistic, clandestine sub-
culture that threatens social order both inside and outside the Muslim 
world. Salafist jihadism is an economic problem, first, in that it impedes 
investment in the areas where it is strongest, and second, in that the 
attacks it inspires cause economic damage both in the initial destruction 
and in the security measures and lost growth that follow.
If salafist jihadism is the problem, what then is the anti salafist jihadist 
idea that seeks to solve this problem? There are, Galula says, four "strate-
gic criteria for a cause [or idea]":
1. The best cause for the insurgent's purpose is one that, by definition, can 
attract the largest number of supporters and repel the minimum of 
opponents....
2. The insurgent must, of course, be able to identify himself totally with 
the cause or, more precisely, with the entire majority of the population 
theoretically attracted by it....
3. To be perfectly sound, the cause must be such that the counterinsur-
gent cannot espouse it too or can do so only at the risk of losing his 
power, which is, after all, what he is fighting for....
4. A cause, finally, must also be lasting, if not for the duration of the revo-
lutionary war, at least until the insurgent movement is well on its 
feet.22
For a cause (i.e. idea) to be viable as the foundation for a political move-
ment, it must be broad, uniquely identified with the movement's organi-
zation, and sufficient to carry the movement to its goal.
The anti salafist jihadism idea must meet David Galula's four "strategic 
requirements" for an idea.23 An anti salafist jihadism idea must be 
uniquely identifiable with the anti salafist jihadist movement. The idea 
must also be shaped such that it cannot be co-opted by the salafist jihadist 
movement. The anti salafist jihadism idea must have sufficient longevity 
to carry it to its ultimate goal—destruction of the salafist jihadism idea. 
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The idea must be structured in a way that gives it broad-based appeal and, 
even more important, avoid arguments against salafism and political 
salafism that will alienate some in the Arab world and narrow its appeal.
This final point must be emphasized. An anti salafist jihadism idea must 
be precisely targeted. Salafist jihadism shares arguments and principles 
with salafism and political salafism, ideas with broad-based appeal in the 
Arab world. The anti salafist jihadism idea must be calibrated to attack 
and destroy only the unwanted behavior of the salafist jihadist move-
ment—international terrorism—without inadvertently and unnecessarily 
challenging those aspects it shares with salafism or political salafism. The 
West frequently has difficulty distinguishing between salafist jihadism 
and its predecessors, and is frequently led astray by distractions like polit-
ical salafism's anti-democratic political structure and brutality toward 
women. While these themes resonate with Western audiences, they are 
counterproductive when communicating to those in the Arab world who 
are already disillusioned with Western-style secular democracy and reject 
gender equality. Seeking democracy and women's rights in the Arab 
world, while a noble goal, is a large part of the reason that the United 
States is still fighting the war on terrorism after more than ten years. 
These issues must be set aside until salafist jihadism is defeated.
The core of any idea is a principle. Because the anti salafist jihadism idea 
seeks to avoid challenging salafism and political salafism, its principle 
must be nuanced. Rather than directly challenge the salafist jihadist prin-
ciple that the Sahaba (the Companions of the Prophet) hold the key to 
perfect freedom (a principle salafist jihadism shares with salafism and 
political salafism), anti salafist jihadism's principle must directly oppose 
the undesirable behavior of salafist jihadists that separates them from 
salafists and political salafists: international terrorism. The principle of 
the anti salafist jihadism idea must be that international terrorism is 
wrong. This directly opposes the undesired behavior of the salafist jihad-
ist movement without passing judgment on the rightness of Islam as it 
was practiced by the Sahaba.
Surrounding the core principle of an idea are arguments. These are asser-
tions or claims that support the principle. Philosophy, particularly logic 
and rhetoric, provides some insights into the structure of arguments. 
Stephen Toulmin, in 1958, proposed what has come to be known as the 
Toulmin Model for the construction of arguments. In his model, a claim 
(i.e., principle) is supported by a hierarchy of arguments. Each order of 
argument provides the basis for the order of arguments below it.24 These 
orders are (from highest to lowest order):
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1. Meta-principles. These highest-order arguments are generally unspo-
ken because they are accepted by everyone. These are foundational 
beliefs that the audience holds.
2. Backing-warrant arguments. Backings are statements that should be 
accepted by everyone because they are derived from meta-principles. 
Each supports a warrant, which is a normative (i.e. prescriptive) 
statement made about the claim—a principle that applies to the 
specific situation.
3. Ground-reason arguments. Grounds are hard data about the situation, 
observable facts. Each reason is an opinion statement supported by at 
least one ground.
4. Counterargument-rebuttal arguments. In defending a claim, one might 
raise possible counterarguments against the claim and then rebut each 
counterargument. These rebuttals might take the form of backing-
warrant or ground-reason arguments.25
Collectively, all of these arguments should lead inexorably to the claim (or 
principle) and exclude all other possible conclusions.
The arguments of the anti salafist jihadism idea should be designed to 
counter the arguments that support international terrorism. However, 
they do not need to be direct counterarguments to salafist jihadism 
arguments. In fact, it is better if they are not, as that will unnecessarily 
bring anti salafist jihadism into conflict with salafism and political 
salafism, which share many arguments with salafist jihadism. Rather, 
they should be backing-warrant arguments, arguments derived from 
meta-principles that the Arab world nearly universally accepts.26 To be 
most effective, the anti salafist jihadism idea should use arguments based 
on the same meta-principles used by the salafist jihadism idea to arrive at 
contradictory conclusions.
Fortunately, the United States does not have to engineer these arguments 
itself. They are already being made by prominent personalities in the Arab 
world. For instance, Muslim scholar Sheikh Yusuf al Qaradawi, a political 
salafist Muslim Brother and Egyptian-born Qatari, is very well known for 
his talk show on al Jazeera, ash Shariah wal Hayat ("Shar'ia and Life"), 
and his website, IslamOnline.net. He has a great deal of influence across 
the Arab world, drawing an audience as large as forty million with his 
television show. He also has credibility as a Muslim Brother; in 2004 he 
turned down the job of leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. He 
also has credibility within the Arab Spring; he was a frequent speaker at 
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demonstrations in Egypt's Tahrir Square and issued a fatwa live on his 
television program demanding that the Libyan Army kill their President, 
Col. Muammar Qaddafi.27 He also has credibility as a stalwart opponent 
of the ista'mar. He has repeatedly defended the right of Iraqis to fight a 
resistance against occupying U.S. forces.
More germane to this discussion, however, al Qaradawi has made a core 
argument of the anti salafist jihadist idea. He has repeatedly argued on his 
television show and website and in his writings and press conferences that 
the kidnapping and killing of civilians is forbidden by Islam. For instance, 
in response to the kidnapping of Italian and French aid workers in Iraq, 
he said, "Islam deals strictly with such a matter of bloodshed. It forbids 
the killing of innocent people who have nothing to do with wars."28 For 
similar reasons, he condemned the 9/11 attacks against the United States. 
In condemning the kidnapping of two Austrians by al-Qaida in North 
Africa, he explained on his television show that kidnapping civilians is 
wrong because "they have no guilt. They are innocent civilians used to 
punish others or apply pressure on them. In Islam people are only respon-
sible for what they do individually."29 These related arguments all rely on 
the same meta-principles as the arguments of the salafist jihadism idea, 
the absolute authority of Allah and the rightness of shar'ia and the Hadith 
(the sayings and examples from the life of the Prophet and the Sahaba).
Another anti salafist jihadism argument also originates with a prominent 
figure in the Arab world. Imam-e-Kaaba Abdul Rahman Ibn Abdul Aziz as 
Sudais is the imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, the holiest site in 
Islam. As such, he is a very well-known and influential figure in the Mus-
lim world. He was named the Dubai International Holy Quran Award's 
(DIHQA) ninth Islamic Personality of the Year in 2005. His recitations of 
the Quran, free for download from the Internet, are also extremely popu-
lar. He even has a presence on Facebook "liked" by over five thousand 
people. As Sudais also has considerable credibility for his opposition to 
the ista'mar; he has repeatedly preached from the Grand Mosque against 
the peace process with Israel. Unfortunately, his rhetoric is also laced 
with racism; for instance, in one sermon he called Jews "the scum of the 
human race, the rats of the world, the violators of pacts and agreements, 
the murderers of the prophets, and the offspring of apes and pigs."30 Nev-
ertheless, as the imam of the most important mosque in Islam, deep in the 
heart of Saudi Arabia, he is a pillar of the salafist Wahhabist clerical com-
munity that underwrites the Saudi regime and wields considerable influ-
ence that could be leveraged against the idea of salafist jihadism.
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Most notable for a future anti salafist jihadist movement, however, as 
Sudais argues against the legitimacy of al-Qaida's jihad. In 2007, as 
Sudais told a gathering in Pakistan that Muslims should work collectively 
rather than fighting individually or creating divisions in Islam. He added, 
"No individual can or has the right to declare and wage jihad." He has also 
condemned terrorism as a tactic, saying in a sermon from the Grand 
Mosque, "We remind those that still sympathize, or harbor [terrorists] 
that they are committing a crime against their religion, their nation and 
their country."31 Like al Qardawi's arguments, these arguments are also 
backing-warrant arguments, based on the same Islamic meta-principles 
as the salafist jihadism idea.
These are just two prominent figures—one a political salafist Muslim 
Brother the other a salafist Wahhabist—who make arguments that sup-
port the anti salafist jihadism idea. There are many, many more from 
within both communities, as well as from the secular moderate commu-
nity, who make similar arguments. Their voices could serve to turn the 
Arab world, including those who support salafism or political salafism, 
away from the salafist jihadism idea.
Just as the salafist jihadism idea has benefits from the telecommunica-
tions age, the anti salafist jihadism idea must also leverage twenty-first 
century technology. Like the salafist jihadism idea, anti salafist jihadism 
can propagate through the mass communications of sympathetic "main-
stream" salafists and political salafists by using figures from those move-
ments to make its arguments. In fact, as shown above, anti salafist 
jihadism is already doing this. By harnessing the energy of the leaders of 
the Arab Spring in those countries where it has borne fruit, the anti 
salafist jihadist movement can compete with the salafist jihadists on the 
Internet as well.
Because it will have the legitimacy and official support that the salafist 
jihadist movement lacks, the anti salafist jihadist movement will also be 
able to transmit its idea through a variety of other means unavailable to 
salafist jihadists. In fact, the idea is already being transmitted through 
these means. Since 2004, the United States has paid Bell Pottinger, a Brit-
ish advertising firm, to run anti-terrorism and anti–sectarian violence 
commercials on satellite television stations across Iraq.32 The highly 
effective campaign was a major factor in turning Sunni Arabs against al-
Qaida in Iraq during the surge. In 2006, an advertising campaign under 
the banner "Terrorism Has No Religion" began broadcasting on pan-Arab 
satellite channels like al Arabiya across the Arab world. It is unclear who 
sponsored the campaign, but at least the initial advertisement, showing a 
suicide bomber blowing himself up in a marketplace, killing women and 
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children, was filmed by a California studio (fueling speculation that the ad 
campaign was a U.S. government effort). The 2004 movie The Martyr is 
just one of a number of independent films originating in the Middle East 
that confront terrorism.33 Thus far, all of these efforts have been rudi-
mentary, tainted by the involvement of the ista'mar. But they do illustrate 
the potential of the anti salafist jihadism idea to fill mainstream Arab 
media spaces that the salafist jihadist movement cannot. Similar efforts 
initiated and executed by national anti salafist jihadism movements could 
be exponentially more effective.
Admittedly, surgically targeting the undesired behavior encouraged by 
the salafist jihadism idea while avoiding challenging the widely supported 
salafism and political salafism ideas also creates a problematic unin-
tended consequence. Seeking out and supporting prominent political 
salafists to carry the anti salafist jihadist message will inevitably empower 
political salafists. The raison d'être of the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
political salafist movements is to bring down secular, Western-backed 
regimes. In practice, the political salafists' alternative is Taliban-style 
totalitarianism. In the process of defeating salafist jihadism, the U.S. may 
be condemning more countries to the same fate as post-Soviet Afghani-
stan. Yet, this is—and always has been—a choice for the Arab world to 
make; fretting over the final political form of the Middle East is yet 
another reason the United States is still embroiled in the war on terrorism 
after a decade.
Likewise, this anti salafist jihadism idea is not without its inherent contra-
dictions. While the anti salafist jihadism idea outlined here prohibits sup-
port to international terrorism, it is silent on the subject of defensive 
jihad, fighting the infidel in Muslim lands. In other words, while the anti 
salafist jihadism idea does prohibit terrorism in Western lands and the 
killing of civilians anywhere, it does not explicitly prohibit attacks against 
the West inside the Muslim world. Attacks like those against the USS Cole 
and Khobar Towers, which targeted U.S. military personnel in Muslim 
lands, would still theoretically be permitted. Moreover, the anti salafist 
jihadism idea is also silent on the subject of political salafist insurgencies 
like the Taliban's insurgency in Afghanistan or al-Qaida in the Maghreb's 
insurgency in Algeria, as long as those insurgencies target police and mili-
tary forces rather than civilians. Of course, if the United States and its 
allies extricate themselves from the war in Afghanistan, much of the case 
for defensive jihad would evaporate, at lease in that nation.
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Conclusion
The Arab Spring provides a unique opportunity not just to reshape the 
political landscape of the Arab world, but also to inoculate the region 
against the insidious disease of salafist jihadism that has hijacked West-
ern strategic thinking for the past decade. The United States and its allies 
must extricate themselves from the remaining military engagements of 
the war on terrorism. But, at the same time, the United States must also 
find and empower the voices within the Arab world that are already 
expressing a powerful and appealing anti salafist jihadism idea. Only then 
can the West move beyond shoring up despotic regimes and toward real 
engagement with the people of the Middle East.
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